文章摘要
GAO Ziming,LV Yang.Study on Distribution Optimization of Enterprise Mark-up Rate under the Strengthening of Labor Justice[J].The Journal of quantitative and technical economics,2023,(6):153-174
劳动保障强化对企业加成率分布优化研究
Study on Distribution Optimization of Enterprise Mark-up Rate under the Strengthening of Labor Justice
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 企业成本加成率  劳动法  资源配置  法律环境
英文关键词: Enterprise Markup  Labor Law  Resource Allocation  Legal Environment
基金项目:本文获得国家社科基金重大项目(21&ZD112;20ZDA041)的资助。
Author NameAffiliation
GAO Ziming Institute of Economics, Nankai University 
LV Yang Institute of Economics, Nankai University 
Hits:
Download times:
中文摘要:
      基于差异化产品竞争模型,将劳动保障法律附加成本嵌入企业生产决策、进入退出决策以及市场竞争决策框架,文章考察在区县—行业市场单元中,劳动法律保护强化通过门槛筛选和直接抵减机制对企业成本加成率分布的改善。本文创新性地选择爬虫获得的司法判例文书数量作为衡量指标,结合工业企业、地区经济、微观调查等数据进行多维度机制检验。研究结论表明:劳动法律保护强化为企业带来劳动雇佣法律附加成本,一方面通过增加企业成本负担,对成本加成率产生直接抵减作用;另一方面通过提高市场门槛,淘汰落后的低效率企业,导致总体上呈现“中值左移”“左截尾点右移”“整体集中”的企业成本加成率优化分布形态。
英文摘要:
      Since the end of the 20th century, China's legal system of labor protection has become an important basis for ensuring the benefit of the labor force and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of employees. Clarifying the boundary of rights and interests and legal responsibilities of both enterprises and employees can regulate the market environment and enhance the market vitality of economic entities. As a positive product of high-quality economic development, the standardized market competition environment will intuitively improve the efficiency of local resource allocation through information transparency and open rules. However, there are very few studies on causality identification and mechanism analysis of the legal environment and resource allocation at the micro level. Most of the studies do not analyze the impact of enhanced legal protection on the decision-making of economic entities through modeling and lack relevant indicators to quantify its degree. This paper takes the labor legal protection environment as the starting point; analyzes its impact on enterprise cost decision, market competition, and entry and exit; and builds a micro analysis bridge of the impact of the macro legal environment on regional resource allocation.In terms of the theoretical model, based on the legal additional cost of labor security, combined with the heterogeneous product competition model, this paper reveals that the distribution and concentration effect of the enhancement of labor legal protection can optimize the allocation of resources. Based on the market competition mechanism, the strengthening of labor legal protection will squeeze the overall distribution up and down from the deductibility of the cost plus rate caused by the increase in employment costs and the promotion of the cost plus rate caused by the increase in the cost threshold for enterprises to enter the market. Thus, the strengthening of labor legal protection will raise the entry and exit threshold of regional enterprises and eliminate backward enterprises. However, the production efficiency of surviving enterprises will decrease due to the increase in unit employment cost, indicating a more concentrated distribution of the overall mark-up rate.In terms of the empirical mechanism test, this paper innovatively selects the number of labor-related case documents disclosed by people's courts as a measure of strengthening labor legal protection. Based on the data of industrial enterprises from 2000 to 2013, the data of legal documents issued by local people's governments, the CHIP and CGSS data of 2007 and 2013, and data from the District And County Statistical Yearbook, multiple empirical analysis equations were constructed to test the theoretical mechanisms of the influence of the strengthening of labor legal protection on the distribution of regional enterprises' cost plus rates step by step. The key explanatory variable of this paper—the number of judicial case documents for labor and employment-related cases is obtained through “web crawler + manual sorting.” The data can be subdivided to district and county levels, covering a wide range and having good continuity and time-varying. The data implicitly consider the heterogeneous social impact of legal cases based on the severity of the case and assign a natural weighting to the indicators. This paper also uses a variety of methods for robustness test, heterogeneity analysis, and mechanism analysis to support the theoretical model and empirical proposition from both sides. The research results reveal that the strengthening of labor legal protection will generate additional legal costs. Then, through direct deduction and threshold screening, the distribution of regional enterprises' cost plus rate can be optimized and the efficiency of resource allocation can be improved. This paper also investigates the heterogeneity of industry competition degree, marketization process, and social residents' satisfaction with the above mechanism. The study concluded that the strengthening of labor legal protection brings additional labor and employment legal costs to enterprises. On the one hand, it directly reduces the cost plus rate by increasing the cost burden of enterprises. On the other hand, it eliminates backward and inefficient enterprises by raising the market threshold. As a result, the enterprise cost plus rate optimization distribution pattern of “median shift to the left,” “left truncation point shift to the right,” and “overall concentration” occurs.This paper expands the research on the economic impact of strengthened legal protection and the factors affecting the efficiency of local resource allocation, focusing on how the strengthening of labor legal protection affects the distribution of enterprise cost plus rate under the effect of market competition mechanism from the perspective of regional legal environment differences and verifies various mechanisms through mathematical models and empirical analysis. It does not conduct a general analysis of the influence of legal environment optimization on the efficiency of resource allocation. In this paper, starting from the increase in legal additional costs due to the strengthening of labor legal protection, the market competition model of heterogeneous products is constructed. It is found that the legal additional costs will produce two forces of “overall left shift” and “left truncation value right shift” on the distribution of markup rate through the direct deduction and threshold screening and finally form an optimal distribution form of “overall concentration.” This paper verifies the existence of the above mechanism through various methods and tries to derive a rigorous and reasonable conclusion.
View Full Text   View/Add Comment  Download reader
Close