| 杨龙见,俞剑,周奕多,周思扬.环境保护税的未预期结果：碳泄漏与生产转移[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2026,(3):54-78 | | 环境保护税的未预期结果：碳泄漏与生产转移 | | The Unintended Impacts of the Environmental Protection Tax: Carbon Leakage and Production Relocation | | | | DOI： | | 中文关键词: 环境保护税 碳泄漏 生产转移 三重差分 价格型环境规制 | | 英文关键词: Environmental Protection Tax Carbon Leakage Production Relocation Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Price-based Environmental Regulation | | 基金项目: | | | 中文摘要: | | 尽管大量证据表明环境保护税能够实现减污降碳，但是企业面对环保税的策略性行为反应尚未得到充分关注。本文采用2015~2021年中国上市公司及其关联企业数据，利用环保税省际税率差异，构建三重差分模型来考察环保税对企业碳排放行为的影响及其内在机制。研究发现，环保税在抑制高税率地区企业碳排放的同时，也在一定程度上诱发了企业通过集团内部生产转移将碳排放“泄漏”至低税率地区：高税率地区转出企业碳排放量有所下降，而低税率地区关联转入企业碳排放量出现上升。机制分析表明，在排除技术进步效应之后，生产转移是导致碳泄漏的关键渠道。进一步研究发现，转出行为在资产负债率较低、媒体关注度较低的企业中更为明显，而转入多是环境承载力较强以及经济发展水平较差的地区。本文从微观层面揭示了环保税政策的碳泄漏效应，为优化制度设计、加强区域协调与集团层面碳排放监管提供了重要的政策启示。 | | 英文摘要: | | This study investigates the unintended impacts of China’s 2018 Environmental Protection Tax (EPT). To promote the modernization of the national governance system and accelerate the construction of a unified national market, a key feature of the EPT is its provision for provincial autonomy in setting tax rates above a national minimum. While intended to accommodate regional heterogeneity, this has created significant cross-provincial disparities in regulatory stringency, raising a critical question: “Do these rate differentials incentivize firms to engage in regulatory arbitrage by relocating production and associated carbon emissions from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions?” This study provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of this phenomenon, known as carbon leakage, which is a crucial, yet underexplored, challenge to the EPT’s effectiveness.We develop two core hypotheses. First, given the physical coupling between taxable air pollutants (e.g., SO2) and carbon emissions during fossil fuel combustion, the EPT implicitly prices carbon. We posit that the EPT’s implementation prompts polluting firms with affiliated entities in low-tax provinces to strategically shift carbon-intensive activities to these regions to minimize their tax burden. This is expected to result in a decrease in their carbon emissions in high-tax provinces and a corresponding increase in emissions for their affiliates in low-tax provinces. Second, we argue that this emissions shift is not an accounting artifact but is driven by the tangible relocation of economic activity. We predict that the transfer of emissions will be accompanied by a parallel transfer of core production inputs and outputs, such as revenue, fixed assets, and labor input.To test these hypotheses, we construct a unique panel dataset of Chinese listed companies from 2015 to 2021, linking financial data with corporate ownership structures and manually collected firm-level carbon emissions data. Our identification strategy relies on a robust difference-in-difference-in-differences model. This framework isolates the causal effect of the EPT by comparing polluting firms in high-tax provinces with relocation channels (i.e., affiliates in low-tax provinces) to similar firms without such channels. To corroborate our findings, we conduct a symmetric analysis from the perspective of the receiving firms in low-tax areas. This dual-panel approach provides a powerful test for the strategic, cross-regional shifting of emissions.Our baseline results reveal compelling evidence of carbon leakage. Following the EPT’s enactment, polluting firms with established relocation channels reduced their local carbon emissions in high-tax provinces by approximately 16%. Moreover, their affiliated entities in low-tax provinces experienced a significant 56.8% increase in emissions. This “one-down, one-up” pattern indicates a strategic reallocation of polluting activities rather than genuine abatement. Most critically, when we aggregate emissions at the consolidated corporate group level, we find no statistically significant decrease in total carbon emissions. This crucial finding highlights a major unintended impact of the policy, that is, in its current form, the EPT appears to incentivize a spatial redistribution of pollution within corporate networks without achieving a net reduction in their overall carbon footprint, thereby undermining national environmental goals.After ruling out the effect of technological progress, mechanism analysis confirms that production relocation is the primary channel for this leakage. The shift in emissions is accompanied by a corresponding transfer of operating revenue, fixed assets, and labor input. Furthermore, heterogeneity analysis provides additional nuance, revealing that this strategic behavior is more pronounced among transfer-out firms with lower financial leverage and lower media visibility, while the transfer-in destinations are concentrated in regions with lighter air pollution and those with low economic development levels. Our findings are robust to a number of tests, including parallel trend assessments, placebo tests, and controlling for concurrent environmental policies such as the emissions trading system pilots.This study contributes to the literature by providing robust micro-level evidence of carbon leakage induced by a price-based environmental policy in a major emerging economy. We extend the “pollution haven” literature by documenting how firms strategically use internal corporate networks as low-friction channels for regulatory arbitrage. Our findings yield critical policy implications: First, the central government should strengthen the top-level design by establishing a dynamic adjustment mechanism for tax rates to compress the space for policy arbitrage. Second, a digitalized monitoring system with consolidated carbon accounting for corporate groups should be established to enable look-through supervision of cross-regional transfers. Third, positive incentives for green innovation should be reinforced to ensure that the net benefits of local technological upgrading exceed those of relocation. Finally, regional coordination mechanisms, such as joint environmental impact assessments and ecological compensation funds, are essential to prevent the formation of pollution havens and ensure the equitable achievement of national dual carbon goals. | | 查看全文 相关附件： 下载数据代码附录 |
| | |
