| 王宝珠,楚文月,叶永卫,郑旭刚.中央财政激励、地方统筹治理与就业增长：来自小微企业的证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2026,(2):80-103 | | 中央财政激励、地方统筹治理与就业增长：来自小微企业的证据 | | Central Fiscal Incentives, Local Coordinated Governance, and Employment Growth: Evidence from Micro and Small Enterprises | | | | DOI： | | 中文关键词: 财政激励 地方统筹治理 小微企业发展 稳就业效应 | | 英文关键词: Fiscal Incentives Local Coordinated Governance Micro and Small Enterprise Development Employment Stabilization Effects | | 基金项目: | | | 中文摘要: | | 小微企业是吸纳就业的主力军，推动其扩大劳动雇佣规模是实现稳就业目标的关键路径。本文首先构建了一个包含目标奖惩的“政府—企业”两部门模型，比较均衡结果表明，中央政府通过建立奖励支持与绩效考核机制，强化地方政府在政策执行中的主体责任，能够有效提高小微企业的最优劳动雇佣规模。实证研究发现，小微企业创业创新基地城市示范政策显著提升了试点城市小微企业劳动雇佣规模。机制分析表明，示范政策推动试点城市统筹财政、税务、工商等部门共同支持小微企业发展，通过降低小微企业交易成本、融资难度与税费负担等方式激励小微企业扩大劳动雇佣规模。并且，企业劳动雇佣规模的提升效果在改革前营商环境较差、金融深化程度较低以及财政压力较大的地区更为显著。进一步分析显示，示范政策提升了小微企业的劳动产出效率，并且显著改善了员工薪酬待遇。本文为完善小微企业政策激励体系、实现稳就业目标提供了重要政策启示。 | | 英文摘要: | | Small and micro enterprises (SMEs) are a major source of job creation in China, enabling them to expand labor demand is central to achieving the macro objective of employment stabilization. However, in practice, SME employment growth is often constrained by some challenges, including administrative and compliance costs, tax and fee burdens, and persistent financing difficulties, whose severity varies across localities. Importantly, these constraints are not purely market outcomes as they are shaped by how local governments implement and coordinate policy instruments and by whether the intergovernmental incentive system induces local authorities to treat employment outcomes as a binding policy objective rather than a discretionary target. While a large empirical literature has explored SME development through the lenses of credit constraints, regulation, and the business environment, comparatively less attention has been paid to the governance channel, namely, how central fiscal incentives coupled with performance assessment can strengthen local responsibility and improve the coherence of multi-department policy delivery. Therefore, the present study examines whether a centrally incentivized, city-level demonstration program can increase SME employment and whether its effectiveness depends on pre-reform local conditions such as the business environment, fiscal pressure, and financial development.Based on the exogenous shock of the SME Innovation and Entrepreneurship Base City Demonstration Policy and the National Tax Survey data from 2011 to 2020, this study employs a difference-in-differences estimation model to assess changes in the labor hiring scale of SMEs. The results indicate that the demonstration policy significantly increases SME employment in pilot cities, consistent with the model’s prediction that a centrally incentivized governance arrangement can be translated into measurable firm-level job growth. Mechanism analyses further reveal that the policy operates through an integrated governance channel, that is, the demonstration program strengthens cross-department coordination and improves the policy “delivery chain” faced by SMEs, thereby lowering administrative and transaction costs, reducing tax and fee burdens, and easing financing constraints. These effects jointly reduce the marginal cost of expanding employment and increase the expected payoff of hiring, leading SMEs to expand their labor force.In addition, evidence from complementary survey-based sources is consistent with the notion that reduced working frictions and improved access to supportive services can raise the time and resources SMEs allocate to production and expansion activities, reinforcing the employment response. The policy effect is heterogeneous across pre-reform local contexts. The employment-promoting impact is more pronounced in regions where the business environment was weaker before the reform, fiscal pressure was higher, and financial deepening was lower. When baseline frictions are more binding, the marginal benefit of coordinated and incentive-backed policy implementation is high. Beyond employment quantity, further analyses indicate that the demonstration program improves labor output efficiency and significantly enhances employee compensation, implying that the policy does not merely expand headcount but may also improve the quality and productivity of employment outcomes. Finally, estimates of the employment-creation effect confirm that the program generates a statistically and economically meaningful increase in jobs, implying nontrivial employment gains when scaled across pilot cities. In summary, the findings underscore the importance of incentive-compatible central-local arrangements and integrated local governance for translating SME support into sustained employment growth, and they have policy implications for refining China’s SME incentive system. | | 查看全文 相关附件： 下载数据代码附录 |
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