| 张勇,赵军柱,陈文,谢星.“土地稳定器”：一个政府房地产交易的新机制[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2025,(6):68-89 | | “土地稳定器”：一个政府房地产交易的新机制 | | “Land Stabilizer”: A New Government Real Estate Transaction Mechanism | | | | DOI： | | 中文关键词: 房地产抵押 土地财政替代 货币政策 房地产金融加速器 | | 英文关键词: Real Estate Mortgage Substitution For Land Finance Monetary Policy Real Estate Finance Accelerator | | 基金项目: | | | 中文摘要: | | 当前,中国鼓励各级政府积极回购存量房地产以稳定宏观经济的政策导向,推动着政府房地产交易机制的革新,拉开了中国土地财政替代的重大政策转型序幕。本文校准了一个政府主导房地产交易的DSGE模型，分析如何用新的政府房地产交易机制替代土地财政及其前景问题。研究发现:第一，“房地产金融加速器是政府房地产交易影响宏观经济的重要传导机制。第二，采用一种逆周期调控的政府房地产交易机制可以增强货币政策稳定中国宏观经济波动的效果，与“土地财政”相对应,本文将这个政府房地产交易机制称为“土地稳定器”。第三,用“土地稳定器”替代“土地财政”可以在降低中国宏观经济波动的同时使得其每年的预期产出增加0.61个百分点,所以用“土地稳定器”替代“土地财政”是中国理想的土地财政替代方案。 | | 英文摘要: | | During the era of land finance, governments at all levels primarily financed fiscal deficits by unilaterally selling or mortgaging real estate, with almost no repurchase of existing properties. China’s land finance is essentially a government real estate transaction (RET) mechanism that uses RETs as a fiscal policy tool to achieve phased policy objectives. The prerequisite for implementing land finance is the government’s ability to dominate RETs and use them as a fiscal policy tool. Public land ownership, a market economy system, and a RET market with macroeconomic influence are the three necessary conditions for the Chinese government to dominate RETs and use them as a fiscal policy tool. China is the only influential major country that meets all three conditions. Thus, using government RETs as a fiscal policy tool is a unique economic phenomenon in China, providing the country with an additional distinct fiscal policy instrument.However, ending land finance would not alter China’s public land ownership or market economy system nor diminish the significant macroeconomic influence of China’s RET market. Therefore, ending land finance does not mean that the Chinese government will cease to dominate RETs or stop using them as a fiscal policy tool. Instead, it signifies the need to replace land finance with a new government RET mechanism. The replacement of land finance is a major strategic issue affecting China’s long-term interests, yet how to substitute it with a new government RET mechanism has not been addressed in academia.Recently, China has encouraged governments at all levels to repurchase existing real estate, breaking the unilateral sale or mortgage transaction mechanism that has characterized land finance since its implementation and marking the first step toward replacing land finance. On November 7, 2024, the Ministry of Natural Resources issued the?Notice on Using Local Government Special Bond Funds to Repurchase Idle Land, and the 2025?Government Work Report?further emphasized supporting governments at all levels in repurchasing existing land and commercial housing as a key focus of this year’s fiscal policy implementation. The central government’s new policy encouraging repurchases and the rapid progress of local governments’ repurchase plans imply that China is already moving toward replacing land finance.Meanwhile, the empirical research in this study finds that the market has responded very positively to China’s policy announcements encouraging governments to repurchase existing real estate, indicating that the market reacts actively to government RETs. This, to some extent, implies that China currently possesses the market foundation and practical feasibility for transitioning to a new government RET mechanism. Therefore, how to replace land finance with a new government RET mechanism and its long-term impact on China’s macroeconomic development is a major strategic issue that urgently needs resolution.This study calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the government dominates RETs and uses them as a fiscal policy tool to analyze how China can replace land finance with a new government RET mechanism and its prospects. The study finds that, regardless of whether the central bank implements conventional or unconventional monetary policy, the government can adopt a countercyclical RET mechanism to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilizing macroeconomic fluctuations. When the central bank implements expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy during economic downturns (booms) to stimulate recovery (curb overheating), the government can inject (repurchase) large quantities of real estate into the market to increase (reduce) the total collateral value of corporate real estate, thereby helping monetary policy more effectively counteract downturns (overheating). This study terms this countercyclical government RET mechanism, which uses real estate collateral value as an intermediary variable to coordinate with monetary policy in stabilizing China’s macroeconomic fluctuations—the “land stabilizer.”The second-order approximation method of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) reveals that employing government RETs as a land stabilizer can reduce China’s macroeconomic fluctuations while increasing the expected annual output level by at least 0.61 percentage points. Therefore, this study recommends replacing “land finance” with “land stabilizer.” | | 查看全文 相关附件： 下载数据代码附录 |
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