| 樊昊达,吴施美,陈诣之.土地价格政策的资源配置效应[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2026,(10):192-215 | | 土地价格政策的资源配置效应 | | The Resource Allocation Effects of Land Price Policy | | | | DOI： | | 中文关键词: 工业用地价格 资源错配 微观机制 制度环境异质性 聚束分析 | | 英文关键词: Industrial Land Pricing Resource Misallocation Micro-mechanisms Institutional Environment Heterogeneity Bunching Analysis | | 基金项目: | | | 中文摘要: | | 完善工业用地价格形成机制是深化要素市场化配置改革、提升资源配置效率的重要内容。本文融合企业异质性动态决策与资源错配理论，研究工业用地限价政策对资源配置效率的影响机制。本文采用聚束分析法，基于中国工业用地交易与企业微观数据识别政策处理效应。研究发现，工业用地价格政策显著降低了资源错配度，其作用机制体现为“二元并行”：选择效应抬升市场准入门槛、优化企业结构，调整效应提升企业要素重组动力、推动内部配置向最优收敛。制度环境异质性分析表明市场化程度与政策效果呈负相关关系，这一现象揭示了特定制度环境下价格信号与行政配置的互补性及资源错配的非线性改善路径。研究拓展了资源错配理论在中国土地产权与要素市场改革语境中的应用，为差异化土地价格形成机制与要素市场制度设计提供了理论与实证依据。 | | 英文摘要: | | Industrial land, as a fundamental factor input for enterprise production, has its pricing mechanism profoundly affecting resource allocation efficiency. The Party’s Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee emphasized perfecting factor market institutions and rules, highlighting the importance of land element marketization reform. Against this backdrop, this paper integrates a heterogeneous-firm dynamic decision model with the theory of resource misallocation to examine how the marketization of industrial land pricing shapes allocative efficiency, with particular focus on the 2007 implementation of China’s Minimum Industrial Land Transfer Price Standard.
Departing from conventional difference-in-differences designs, we employ a bunching approach, leveraging microdata on China’s industrial land transactions from the China Land Market Website and firm-level data from the National Tax Survey Database spanning 2007 to 2016. The bunching method is particularly suitable for this policy context because local governments’ strategic price manipulation around the minimum price threshold renders traditional regression discontinuity designs invalid, while the continuous nature of the policy variable poses challenges for standard DID frameworks.
We first construct a unified theoretical model building upon Melitz (2003) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), incorporating enterprise dynamic entry-exit decisions, internal resource allocation distortions, and external price distortions. The model yields two key propositions: a “selection effect” whereby higher land costs raise entry thresholds and screen out less productive firms, and an “adjustment effect” whereby increased land costs raise the opportunity cost of maintaining suboptimal factor allocations, incentivizing surviving firms to optimize their input mix.
Our empirical analysis reveals significant bunching behavior in the land price distribution around the policy threshold, with actual transaction prices substantially concentrated above the minimum price standard. The estimated average price markup is approximately 1.66 times, providing quantitative evidence of the policy’s strong impact on the land market price structure. The intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates demonstrate that the policy significantly reduces enterprise-level and industry-county-level resource misallocation indices, with the enterprise-level composite misallocation index declining by 1.806 units. Both labor and capital distortion measures show significant reductions, with labor misallocation correction being particularly pronounced.
Robustness checks employing alternative parameter specifications, total factor productivity measures (using both Olley-Pakes and Levinsohn-Petrin methods), revenue-based TFP following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and Olley-Pakes covariance decomposition measures consistently confirm the main findings. Importantly, we find that the policy’s R&D expenditure effect is significantly negative, ruling out technological progress as the driving channel and supporting the resource reallocation mechanism.
Mechanism analysis provides empirical support for both theoretical channels. For the selection effect, we document significant declines in new firm entry growth rates following policy implementation. For the adjustment effect, firms’ capital-labor ratios converge significantly toward industry-optimal levels.
Institutional heterogeneity analysis using both the Fan Gang marketization index and a Land Allocation Method Index reveals that regions with lower marketization levels exhibit stronger policy effects. This seemingly paradoxical finding reflects three complementary mechanisms: greater initial misallocation providing larger improvement margins, diminishing marginal returns to price correction in already well-functioning markets, and institutional complementarity between price signals and administrative allocation under specific institutional conditions.
This study extends the application of resource misallocation theory to China’s context of land property rights and factor market reforms, and provides theoretical and empirical foundations for differentiated land pricing mechanisms and factor market institutional design. | | 查看全文 相关附件： 下载数据代码附录 |
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