| 汪勇,冯心歌,赵宸宇.数字金融、信息不对称与小微企业融资——来自助贷机构的证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2026,(1):242-264 |
| 数字金融、信息不对称与小微企业融资——来自助贷机构的证据 |
| Digital Finance, Information Asymmetry, and Small Business Credit: Evidence from the Third-party Loan Facilitator |
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| 中文关键词: 数字金融 小微企业 融资 逆向选择 道德风险 |
| 英文关键词: Digital Finance Micro and Small Enterprises Financing Adverse Selection Moral Hazard |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 数字金融的发展为解决小微企业“融资难、融资贵”问题提供了重要契机。本文基于2017~2020年国内某助贷机构脱敏的小微企业信贷数据，考察数字金融发展对小微企业融资的影响。研究发现，数字金融发展通过扩大金融服务供给，显著降低了小微企业贷款利率，有效增加了小微企业贷款金额，进而在一定程度上缓解小微企业所面临的融资约束困境。在服务小微企业融资方面，数字金融与传统金融互为补充，且在货币政策宽松时期、经济政策不确定性较高的时期对小微企业融资成本的改善作用更大。在传导机制上，数字金融对信息失灵具有非对称效应，一方面，数字金融能够缓解逆向选择，降低借贷双方的事前信息不对称；另一方面，数字金融会放大道德风险，导致借贷双方的事后信息不对称有所上升。本文研究结论为发展数字金融化解小微企业“融资难、融资贵”问题提供了事实依据和完善方向。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Micro and small enterprises (MSEs) are a key driving force of China’s economic development. Due to their short operating history, limited scale, and lack of collateral, MSEs often struggle to obtain funding from traditional financial institutions and are unable to access capital markets directly. Thus, the long-standing problem of “difficult and costly financing” has constrained their survival and growth. Moreover, the rapid development of digital finance has lowered the cost of financial services, reduced information asymmetry, enhanced service efficiency, and improved financial inclusion, all of which offer an important opportunity to alleviate MSEs’ financing constraints. Although digital finance primarily targets long-tail clients such as MSEs and low-income groups, the existing literature largely relies on data from listed firms, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), or private enterprises. This limits the persuasiveness of the current findings and leaves the underlying mechanisms insufficiently explored. Therefore, investigating the impact of digital finance on MSE financing is crucial.Using desensitized loan-level data on MSE credit from a domestic loan-assistance institution from 2017 to 2020, this study empirically examines how digital finance affects the financing of MSEs. We find that by expanding the supply of financial services, digital finance significantly reduces loan interest rates and effectively increases loan amounts for MSEs, thereby mitigating their financing constraints to some extent. Digital finance complements traditional finance in serving MSEs’ financing needs, and its cost-reducing effect is stronger in periods of monetary policy easing and heightened economic policy uncertainty. Regarding the transmission mechanisms, digital finance exerts asymmetric effects on information failures. On the one hand, it mitigates adverse selection by reducing ex ante information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. On the other hand, it amplifies moral hazard, increasing ex post information asymmetry.This study contributes to the literature in three dimensions. First, using unique data, it more accurately identifies the effects of digital finance on MSEs’ financing costs and loan volumes. The lending behavior of MSEs, particularly individual industrial and commercial households, differs substantially from SMEs or consumer lending in terms of loan purpose, amount, maturity, collateral, repayment methods, and risk characteristics. Previous studies often relied on listed firms, SME loans, consumer credit, or regional credit indicators, which cannot adequately capture the financing behavior of MSEs or individual business owners-the core service targets of digital finance. By employing high-frequency, large-sample, and broad-coverage micro-loan data dominated by individual business operators, this study provides a more suitable empirical foundation for analyzing MSE financing behavior.Second, the study expands the understanding of the mechanisms through which digital finance influences enterprise financing. Traditional institutions are subject to stricter regulation, rely heavily on collateral, and offer long-term loans, while fintech firms primarily issue short-term, small-amount credit loans. Prior research reveals that digital finance alleviates adverse selection and moral hazard in bank-SME lending, but whether these conclusions apply to fintech credit for MSEs, especially individual business owners, remains underexplored. Moreover, existing studies offer mixed evidence on whether digital finance reduces moral hazard. From the perspective of a loan-assistance institution, this study reveals a differentiated mechanism as follows: digital finance reduces ex ante information asymmetry by mitigating adverse selection but increases ex post information asymmetry by amplifying moral hazard due to low default costs for first-time borrowers and the encouragement of over-borrowing. Third, from a supply-side perspective, the study uncovers heterogeneous effects of digital finance on MSE financing under different macroeconomic conditions, providing important empirical evidence for helping MSEs cope with external shocks and informing government policy design. On one hand, MSEs can leverage the counter-cyclical advantages of digital finance and proactively access funding through digital platforms during policy uncertainty or economic downturns to cushion the impact of traditional credit contraction. On the other hand, policymakers should enhance the counter-cyclical role of digital finance, construct a financial service system in which digital and traditional finance complement one another, and strengthen compliance supervision over loan-assistance institutions to curb moral hazard. Through supply-side structural reforms in the financial sector, these efforts can more effectively alleviate MSEs’ financing constraints. |
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