| 杜 勇,孙 帆,曹 磊.共同机构所有权可以促进企业升级吗？[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2023,(10):181-201 | | 共同机构所有权可以促进企业升级吗？ | | Can Common Institutional Ownership Promote Enterprise Upgrading? | | | | DOI： | | 中文关键词: 共同机构所有权 企业升级 协同治理 高质量发展 过度竞争 | | 英文关键词: Common Institutional Ownership Enterprise Upgrading Collaborative Governance High-quality Development Excessive Competition | | 基金项目: | | | 中文摘要: | | 企业升级是推动中国经济高质量发展和构建新发展格局的微观基础，但近年来日益严峻的过度竞争和委托代理问题制约了企业升级，探索企业间过度竞争的协同机制和缓解代理问题的治理模式十分紧迫和重要。本文基于资本市场中逐渐活跃的共同机构所有权这一视角发现，其显著促进了企业升级。就影响机理而言，共同机构所有权通过发挥协同效应强化了企业升级能力，并通过发挥治理效应提升了企业升级意愿；作用路径检验发现，共同机构所有权通过委派董事实现协同和治理。从不同维度刻画企业升级发现，共同机构所有权提升了企业创新能力、创新成果以及成长性。异质性分析表明，在国有企业、瓶颈期企业以及经济发达地区，共同机构所有权助推企业升级的效果越明显，且非国有共同机构投资者越多，协同治理效果越显著。本文不仅从企业高质量发展视角丰富了共同机构所有权的协同治理效应研究，也为监管部门规范和引导共同机构所有权发展提供有益启示。 | | 英文摘要: | | How to achieve high-quality development of the Chinese economy is an extremely important issue to study. The high-quality development of enterprises is the micro foundation of high-quality economic development. With the new round of science and technology revolution reshaping the industrial competition pattern and the transformation of old and new kinetic energies putting forward higher requirements for enterprise strategy, how to achieve enterprise upgrading and thus shift to a high-quality development mode has become an important issue that Chinese enterprises urgently need to consider and solve. In reality, enterprises face difficulties in upgrading. On the one hand, enterprise resources are prone to excessive competition, leading to the strange phenomenon of “growth without development.” On the other hand, due to the widespread separation of ownership and control in modern enterprises, the characteristics of enterprise upgrading, high investment, and high risk can easily lead to principal-agent conflicts, which makes it a big issue whether managers have sufficient willingness and ability to promote enterprise upgrading. Under this circumstance, how to alleviate excessive competition among enterprises and resolve the principal-agent conflicts within enterprises to help them break through upgrading barriers have become a research topic with high practical value. With the increasing prevalence of institutional investors simultaneously holding shares in multiple companies in the same industry, the emerging ownership model of common institutional ownership is gradually becoming active in the capital market. Researches have demonstrated that when holding shares in multiple companies in the same industry, due to sufficient industry information and rich management experience, common institutional ownership has a strong motivation to exert synergistic effects on companies to alleviate excessive competition and low level of cooperation among holding companies. Moreover, it has sufficient ability to participate in enterprise decision-making and supervise governance to alleviate principal-agent conflicts. In view of these, this study explores the impact, mechanism, and path of common institutional ownership on enterprise upgrading.Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2021, this study finds that, first, common institutional ownership significantly promotes enterprise upgrading, and this conclusion still holds even after using multiple methods to control for potential endogeneity issues. Second, the impact mechanism test reveals that common institutional ownership strengthens the upgrading ability of enterprises by exerting synergistic effects and enhances the upgrading willingness of enterprises by exerting governance effects. In addition, the path test reveals that common institutional investors achieve synergy and governance by appointing directors. Third, from different dimensions of enterprise upgrading, it is found that common institutional ownership helps to enhance the innovation capability, innovation achievements, and growth of enterprises. Further, the heterogeneity tests reveal that the effect of common institutional ownership on promoting enterprise upgrading is more significant in state-owned enterprises, bottleneck enterprises, and developed regions, and the more the number of non-state-owned common institutional investors, the more significant the synergistic governance effect.This study emphasizes the positive role played by common institutional ownership in the capital market, and based on the above findings, it proposes the following suggestions, first, the current policies of government departments toward common institutional ownership should be encouragement-oriented and regulation-supplemented to make full use of that. Second, Chinese listed companies should fully leverage the synergistic governance role of common institutional investors, introducing them as important strategic investors in the mixed ownership reform and further encouraging and supporting common institutional investors to participate in the management and investment decisions of private listed companies at the policy level through the board of directors. This study provides new ideas for establishing “hematopoietic” government subsidies and the effective utilization of state-owned capital. Enterprises can use traditional government subsidies to establish industry support funds and simultaneously hold multiple enterprises in the industry, which can give full play to the collaborative governance value of state-owned common institutional investors. | | 查看全文 相关附件： 下载数据代码附录 |
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