| 谢贞发,陈芳敏,陈卓恒.激励与能动性：非对称财政收支分权与企业资本跨区域流动[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2023,(1):87-108 | | 激励与能动性：非对称财政收支分权与企业资本跨区域流动 | | Incentive and Initiative: Asymmetric Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Decentralization and Inter-regional Capital Flows | | | | DOI： | | 中文关键词: 非对称财政收支分权 政府与市场 资本跨区域流动 | | 英文关键词: Asymmetric Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure Decentralization Government and Market Inter-regional Capital Flows | | 基金项目:本文获得国家社会科学基金重大项目“基本公共服务均等化建设中的地方财政体制改革研究”（18ZDA096）以及厦门大学经济学院财政系研究生科研创新项目“基于财政事权与支出责任划分的地方政府行为研究”和“财政压力与地方政府应对策略研究”的资助。作者感谢匿名审稿专家和编辑部的宝贵意见，文责自负。摘要：财政体制是影响政府与市场、政府与企业关系 | | | 中文摘要: | | 财政体制是影响政府与市场、政府与企业关系的基础性制度。基于分税制财政体制特征，本文提出了一个“非对称财政收支分权”的概念性框架，利用全国市县级政府财政数据和上市公司数据，实证检验了市县级政府非对称财政收支分权对当地企业资本跨区域流动的影响及内在逻辑。结果显示，非对称财政收支分权尤其是支出分权大于收入分权的负向非对称性会显著驱使本地企业在异地投资设立子公司。这一效应在非国有企业、制造业企业和东部地区更加明显，且主要促进了资本的省内跨市流动。机制分析表明，企业所在地和投资目标地的财政收支分权差异通过市场投资环境从“推力”和“拉力”两方面共同驱使企业进行跨区域投资决策。进一步研究发现，非对称财政收支分权驱使的企业资本跨区域流动在短期内造成了企业非效率投资尤其是过度投资的增加以及资本回报率的下降，不利于资本配置效率的提升。在当前加快建设全国统一大市场的背景下，本文的研究为建立健全省以下财政体制改革、推动有效市场和有为政府结合提供了重要参考。 | | 英文摘要: | | A scientific and effective intergovernmental fiscal relationship is an institutional resource that can help optimize resource allocations, maintain market unity, promote social equity, and achieve long-term national stability. Important and practical questions to address are as follows. How can the government reduce undue intervention in micro subjects, through scientific and reasonable financial system reform? How can it better promote the combination of active grassroots government and an effective market? Revenue and expenditures are the two aspects of finance, and the fiscal system of a multi-level government should separate fiscal revenue decentralization and expenditure decentralization. The theory and practice of fiscal reform since the founding of China have focused on decentralizing fiscal revenue. However, there has been little focus on the decentralization of fiscal expenditures and the relationship between fiscal revenue and expenditure among governments.This paper proposes a conceptual framework for asymmetric fiscal revenue and expenditure decentralization. Using historical and theoretical logic, the paper describes the impact of asymmetric fiscal revenue and expenditure decentralization on local government behavior, arguing this behavior has led to biased market interventions by local governments, has affected the investment decisions of enterprises in their jurisdictions, and has driven business capital to move across regions. This paper is the first to construct an indicator that measures the degree of asymmetric decentralization of fiscal revenues and expenditures at the city level, using data on municipal and county government finances and listed companies. The paper also examines the impact of asymmetric local fiscal decentralization on firms' cross-regional investments, and the underlying logic. The benchmarking results reveal that asymmetric local fiscal revenue and expenditure decentralization significantly drive local firms to invest and set up subsidiaries in off-site locations. This is particularly true where expenditure decentralization is greater than revenue decentralization. This effect is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms, manufacturing firms, and in the eastern regions. The effect mainly promotes intra-provincial cross-city capital flows, with no significant effect on inter-provincial capital flows. An analysis of the mechanism indicates that cross-regional investment is achieved through a combination of “push and pull” from the source and the target. Asymmetric fiscal decentralization may lead to biased market intervention by local governments. This does not support the development of the local market investment environment, thereby driving local firms to shift their capital outward through off-site investment. At the same time, investment target locations with less asymmetric fiscal decentralization attract firms to invest in them, due to the better regional investment environment. Further study indicates that the cross-regional capital flows driven by asymmetric fiscal decentralization lead to an increase in inefficient and over-investment. It also leads to a decrease in the return on capital in the short run, which does not support improvements in capital allocation efficiency.This paper makes three key contributions to the field. First, based on existing studies on different non-market factors of cross-regional capital flows, this paper focuses on the effects of a differentiated sub-provincial decentralized institutional environment on the cross-regional flows of micro-enterprise capital. This provides new ideas and evidence to better describe the relationship between fiscal institutions and market agents. Second, the study expands and deepens existing fiscal decentralization theories, and extends the research on the economic effects of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Finally, this paper also explores the possible distortionary effects of capital flows across regions as a result of non-market factors. This is important for further forming a stable system that matches governmental authority, expenditure responsibilities, and financial resources, and that accelerates the formation of an endogenous growth mechanism for market-led investment. | | 查看全文 相关附件： 下载数据代码附录 |
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